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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This case arises under the citizen suit provision of the Clean
Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (2006) and the federal common law of
nuisance. The CAA is federal statutes. Federal courts have juris-
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diction over all cases arising from federal statutes. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 (2004).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED
FOR REVIEW
1. After Illinois v. City of Milwaukee does there remain a federal common law of nuisance that could be applied to carbon dioxide emissions from power plants in New Union?
2. Is the harm to Plaintiffs Province of Inuksuk and Village of
Akuli sufficiently concrete to provide standing to bring the nuisance action?
3. If a public nuisance exists related to C0 2 under either federal or state law, is it appropriate to apply the Landers v. East
Texas Salt Water Disposal Co. rule on indivisible harm to the circumstances in this case?
4. Should the precautionary principle, a principle of customary international law, be a consideration in balancing benefits
versus harm in a nuisance analysis?
5. Is U.S. Environmental Protection Agency required by section 115 of the Clean Air Act to notify the Governor of New Union
that the State must amend its State Implementation Plan to reduce emissions from the defendant power plants to a level consistent with emissions that can be achieved using the currently
available control technology?
6. Is the United States government, acting through the EPA,
required under the Trail Smelter doctrine to reduce CO 2 emissions
to levels that can be achieved through the application of currently
available control technology so as to minimize harm to a neighboring country?
-STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from an order of the United States District
Court for the District of New Union granting the motions for summary judgment of Genergy Corp., Atomic Energy, Inc., Centennial
Power Co., Power Suppliers Co., and First Energy, Ltd. ("Corporations") and the Administrator of the Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA"). R. at 3. The Province of Inuksuk, and the Village
of Akuli, Canada ("Plaintiffs") against the Corporations on federal
common law of nuisance and alternatively on the public nuisance
law of the State of New Union, United States, where the defendant companies are located, seeking monetary damages dollars
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and an injunction requiring the Corporations to reduce carbon dioxide (CO 2) emissions. R. at 1. The Province of Inuksuk also
brought suit under the citizen suit provisions of the Clean Air Act
(CAA), 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (2006), against the EPA for (1) failing to
require the Corporations to lower emissions and (2) to impose a
duty under international law to regulate C0 2 emissions from coalfired power plants. R. at 1-2.
The EPA and the Corporations filed motions for summary
judgment in both cases. R. at 2. In the first action, the Corporations and the EPA argued that that there is no federal common
law of nuisance for air pollution, and that even if there were, the
Plaintiffs lacked standing and the precautionary principle could
not be used to support such a claim. R at 2. The Corporations
further argued that joint and several liability would not apply, either under federal or state law, while the EPA agreed with the
Plaintiffs on that issue. R. at 2. Both Defendants opposed the
remedies sought by the Plaintiffs. In the second action, the EPA
argued that the Administrator has no mandatory duty to undertake the actions sought by the Plaintiff Inuksuk, and is not obligated under international law to regulate to prevent harm in a
foreign state. R. at 2. These arguments are supported by the Corporations, who also contend the claims involve political questions
outside the jurisdiction of the court. R at 2.
The two cases were consolidated by order of the Chief Judge
of the District Court for the State of New Union. R. at 4. The
District Court granted the Corporations' motion on all counts (R.
at 12). The Plaintiffs filed this timely appeal, contesting each of
the District Court's rulings.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Plaintiffs are the Canadian province of Inuksuk and the Inuit
village of Akuli. Akuli, a village typical of those found in Inuksuk,
is a small, primitive fishing community situated on frozen tundra
and bordered by the Hudson Bay and Hudson Strait. Over the
past decade, Akuli has documented increased erosion and flooding
within their borders, and noticed that sea ice has begun to form
later in the year and melt away earlier.
Concerned by these observations, Akuli commissioned the Inuit Commission-a duly constituted international agency-to
study the causes. The resulting "Inuksuk Study" found that the
loss of sea ice was due to rising temperatures in the region. Further, the Study predicted that if flooding and erosion were to con-
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tinue at its current rate, a major portion of the village could be
damaged in approximately three years.
Another international study, the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment, found that temperatures in the Arctic region are rising
at twice the rate of the rest of the world. The Assessment attributed this temperature change to the accumulation of greenhouse
gases in the atmosphere, causing a phenomenon known as "global
warming." One of the gases, C0 2 , is a common and natural byproduct of energy production, and has therefore risen steadily
worldwide since the Industrial Revolution.
Although both of these studies were based on highly controversial climate modeling techniques, leading to some of the most
famously disputed predictions in modern history, Akuli decided to
take the drastic step of relocating their entire village several miles
inland, at a staggering cost of 260 million dollars. To finance this
move, Akuli selected some defendants for a nuisance suit by
merely naming the five most successful energy companies in the
neighboring United States. The Province of Inuksuk also sued the
EPA, alleging that the federal CAA provides a mandatory duty for
the EPA to regulate any pollutant that it reasonably anticipates
will endanger public welfare in another country. The suit claims
that the EPA had knowledge to create that reasonable anticipation, and that they failed to act. The cases were consolidated, and
the District Court of the District of New Union granted summary
judgment to the Defendants. Judge Remus held that the Plaintiffs'
common law claims were preempted by the CAA, and that they
lacked standing anyway because they suffered no injury-in-fact as
required by the U.S. Constitution. As to the claims against the
EPA, the court held that the agency was well within their discretion in declining harsh restrictions on C0 2, citing the uncertainty
of global warming science and the delicate political questions involved in the issue. This case is now on appeal to the Twelfth Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Plaintiffs' claims under the federal common law must fail because there exists no common law of nuisance for air-based pollutants. The Plaintiffs' first obstacle is that their claim is preempted
by the federal CAA. This is evident because of the comprehensiveness of the CAA (as evidenced through its language, legislative
history, and similarity to other Acts which have been deemed preemptive), and also because to apply the common law of nuisance
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would be a judicial regulation that would create actual, direct conflict with the policies of the two other branches of government.
Plaintiffs second obstacle is that global warming cases are unjusticiable by the courts, because they present a "political question"
inappropriate for judicial activism.
But even if the Court decides that a common law claim can
survive, these Plaintiffs lack standing for such a suit. To create
standing, a plaintiff must establish that: (1) They suffered an "injury in fact," not merely a speculative or hypothetical injury; (2)
There is a causal connection between that injury and the alleged
misconduct, and the injury was not caused by some third party;
and (3) It is likely, not just possible, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable court decision. These Plaintiffs will have
difficulty satisfying any of those elements, but will find it impossible to establish that they suffered an "injury in fact," because their
alleged injury has not yet occurred, and is not "imminent" as required by courts. Because of the uncertainty of climate modeling
predictions, and Supreme Court precedent requiring "substantial
certainty" of future injury before standing can be granted, Plaintiffs cannot even qualify for the first step of a federal lawsuit.
And even if standing were granted to Plaintiffs, the Corporations are not appropriate defendants in this case. Although Plaintiffs have crudely selected five major "deep pocket" energy
companies who emit carbon dioxide from their power plants, and
joined them through the theory of "joint and several liability," this
strategy is deficient in two respects. First, most modern courts
have de-emphasized or abolished the doctrine of joint and several
liability entirely, because of the rise of comparative fault theory.
Second, joint and several liability, even if viable, is only applicable
if the injury cannot be apportioned with reasonable certainty
among the individual defendants. But here, undisputed market
share statistics show to fine degree how the injury may be apportioned. Applying the popular "market share" theory of liability,
each Corporation would be responsible for only about one percent
of the damage in Plaintiffs claim.
However, if the Plaintiffs successfully demonstrate a nuisance
claim, the precautionary principle is of no avail to them. The principle has not been adopted by the U.S. federal government, and
there is no case law supporting its application. Furthermore, the
principle is inapplicable in public nuisance actions, because such
actions seek to correct injuries that have already occurred. Conversely, the precautionary principle advocates knowledge-gather-
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ing about adverse health or environmental consequences before
actions are taken or new technologies adopted. Thus, the principle
should play no role in the in balancing of benefits versus harm in a
nuisance analysis.
The Plaintiffs statutory claim will be similarly unsuccessful.
The EPA has neither the obligation nor the authority under CAA
§ 115 to issue an endangerment finding with respect to CO 2 emissions from the Corporations that requires a reduction in emissions
to a level achievable using the currently available control technology for two primary reasons. First, the CAA § 115 does not give
the EPA regulatory authority over CO 2 emissions. Second, even if
the EPA is found to have regulatory powers over CO 2 emissions
under CAA § 115, the statute gives the EPA broad discretionary
authority to make regulatory determinations.
Finally, the Plaintiffs international law claim raised presents
a clearly nonjusticiable political question, because a determination is not judicially manageable, requires initial policy determinations to be made by the elected branches of government, and
would express a profound a lack of respect for Congressional policy decisions on a matter that calls for unquestioning adherence
by the courts.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The district court granted Genergy Corp., Atomic Energy,
Inc., Centennial Power Co., Power Suppliers Co., and First Energy, Ltd.'s motions for summary judgment. The appropriate
standard of review for a grant of summary judgment is de novo.
Dynacore Holdings Corp. v. U.S. Philips Corp., 363 P.3d 1263,
1273 (9th Cir. 2004). A district court's summary judgment order
must be upheld if the record discloses "that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986). Because this Court
reviews the district court's judgment, not its reasoning, it may affirm on any ground supported by the record. EEOC v. Aramark
Corp., 208 F.3d 266, 268 (D.C. Cir. 2000); see also Estades-Negroni
v. Assocs. Corp. of N. Am., 377 F.3d 58, 62 (1st Cir. 2004).
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ARGUMENT
I. THERE EXISTS NO FEDERAL COMMON LAW OF
NUISANCE FOR AIR-BASED POLLUTANTS.
Plaintiffs claim that the Corporations' carbon dioxide emissions constitute a public nuisance under the federal common law.
However, this claim must fail because there is no federal common
law that can be applied to cases involving air-based pollutants.
Generally speaking, federal courts, unlike their state counterparts, are not courts of common law. It has therefore been said
that "there is no federal general common law." Erie R.R. Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). However, there still exist a few
pockets of federal common law, "resorted to in the absence of an
applicable act by Congress, and because the Court is compelled to
consider federal questions which cannot be answered from federal
statutes alone." Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 314 (1981)
(hereinafter Milwaukee II) (internal quotations and citations
omitted). These remnants of federal common law are fragile, however, and "subject to the paramount authority of Congress." New
Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 348 (1931). "When Congress addresses a question previously governed by a decision rested on federal common law, the need for such an unusual exercise by federal
courts disappears," and the common law yields and vanishes. Milwaukee 11, 451 U.S. at 314. Such a situation has occurred in the
field of air and ozone pollution, as both Congress and the Executive branch have addressed the issue repeatedly.
A. Federal common law of air pollution nuisance is
preempted by the federal Clean Air Act.
A federal regulatory scheme preempts the common law if it is
"comprehensive" and leaves "no room for courts to attempt to improve on that program with federal common law." Milwaukee 11.
The CAA is such a legislative scheme. As a consequence, it
preempts the common law claims that Plaintiffs attempt.
1. The language and legislative history of the CAA
express a Congressional intent of
comprehensiveness.
In determining whether a federal regulatory scheme is comprehensive, courts look primarily to the intent of Congress and
ask whether it meant to "[leave] the formulation of appropriate
federal standards to the courts." Milwaukee 1H, 451 U.S. at 317.
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Here, the CAA indicates a strong intent of comprehensiveness on
the part of Congress. Introducing amendments to the Act on the
House floor, Rep. Henry Waxman announced, "We have laid out a
comprehensive program initiated by the Congress seven years
ago." U.S. Gov.PRINTING OFFICE, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF

1977, 334. The Executive branch

agreed; when President Carter signed the amendments into law,
he remarked that "Congress has adopted a sound and comprehensive program for achieving and preserving healthy air in our Nation."1 Id. at 303.
The language of the CAA also illustrates a comprehensive
scheme. The "declaration of purpose" announces that the first
goal of the Act is to "to protect and enhance the quality of the Nation's air resources so as to promote the public health and welfare
and the productive capacity of its population." 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 7401(b)(1). Such ambitious, sweeping language indicates that
Congress has assumed the responsibility of regulating all situations in which air pollution affects the public welfare. Consequently, "there is no room for courts to attempt to improve on that
program with federal common law," and Plaintiffs' nuisance
2
claims are preempted.
2.

The Clean Air Act's similarity to the Clean Water
Act supports a claim of comprehensiveness.

The Clean Water Act (CWA) was passed by Congress in 1972
to "restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters." 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2006). It addressed concerns that had previously only been resolvable through
the common law of public nuisance. In Milwaukee II, a plaintiff
attempted such a claim under the federal common law against an
out-of-state polluter of Lake Michigan. The Court held that the
previously-recognized common law remedy was no longer available, id. at 333, reasoning that "Congress... has occupied the field
1. Although by 1977 both Congress and the President already viewed the CAA
as comprehensive, the Act has subsequently undergone several major amendments,
making its scope even larger. The 1990 amendments addressed several ozone concerns, changing stratospheric ozone provisions to phase out the most damaging chemicals, and implementing a program to control acid rain. See Clean Air Act,
Amendments, P.L. 101-549; Mark L. Manewitz, "Clean Air Act Overview," 459 PLI

Lit 99 (1993).
2. Courts have agreed in finding the CAA to be "comprehensive." See for example
Reeger v. Mill Service, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 360, 361-62 (W.D. Penn. 1984) (also noting
the comprehensiveness of the Clean Water Act).
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through the establishment of a comprehensive regulatory program supervised by an expert administrative agency," Id. at 317.
In a later case, the Supreme Court reiterated that "the federal
common law of nuisance in the area of water pollution is entirely
preempted" by the CWA. Middlesex County Sewage Authority v.
National Sea Clammers Assn., 453 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1981).
Because of its similarity to the CWA, the CAA should also be
seen as entirely preempting the common law of nuisance for air
pollution. This similarity was analyzed by the District Court of
New Jersey, which held that like the CWA, the CAA "occupied the
field" of air-based pollutants by establishing "a complete regulatory procedure whereby various pollutants are identified, air quality standards are set, and procedures for strict enforcement are
created." United States v. Kin-Buc, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 699, 702
(D.N.J. 1982) (holding a plaintiffs common law nuisance claims
preempted under the CAA).
Despite the similarities, it has been noted that an important
difference between the two Acts is that "[w]hile the [CWA] regulates every point source of water pollution, the CAA regulates only
those stationary sources of air pollution that are found to threaten
national ambient air quality standards." Kin-Buc, Inc., 532 F.
Supp. at 701. In other words, while the CWA regulates virtually
all pollution of waterways, the CAA is allegedly less comprehensive because it is only "concerned with ensuring that air is healthy
to breath." David A. Grossman, Warming Up to a Not-So-Radical
Idea: Tort-Based Climate Change Litigation, 28 COLUM. J. ENWL.
L. 1, 36 (2003). As a result, some scholars argue, courts should
hold that ozone-depletion claims are not preempted because they
have nothing to do with whether the air is breathable. Id.
However, this argument is flawed in two respects. First, The
CWA also leaves large sources of water pollution (all non-point
sources) almost entirely unregulated. 3 Second, amendments to the
3. Because of this lack of non-point source regulation, the losing side in Milwaukee II unsuccessfully argued that the Clean Water Act was not "comprehensive" either. The Supreme Court dismissed the argument: "Demanding specific regulations of
general applicability before concluding that Congress has addressed the problem to
the exclusion of common law asks the wrong question. The question is whether the
field has been occupied, not whether it has been occupied in a particular manner."
Milwaukee 11, 451 U.S. at 324. Here, Plaintiffs make a similar argument that the
CAA lacks comprehensiveness just because it declines to regulate some atmospheric
emissions. But the Supreme Court made clear in Milwaukee II that just because a
party believes that a specific type of pollution has been inadequately considered and
addressed, it doesn't mean that it hasn't in fact been considered and addressed. With
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CAA in 1990 significantly added to the CAA, making it much more
similar in scope to its Clean Water counterpart. See Michael R.
Barr, Introduction to the Clean Air Act: History, Perspective, and
Directionfor the Future, in THE CLEAN AIR HANDBOOK 1, 7 (Robert
J. Martineau, Jr. & David P. Novello eds., 2d ed. 2004). As mentioned earlier, these amendments added regulation for certain
ozone-depleting chemicals and implemented an acid rain control
program, expanding the scope of the Act to cover issues quite similar to the ones faced by the Plaintiffs. Especially in light of these
recent additions, the CAA should now be viewed as at least as
comprehensive as the CWA. And like the CWA, the preemptive
reach of the CAA is total.
B.

Plaintiff's common law claims are also preempted
because they are in actual conflict with federal
legislative policy.

Common law can also be preempted if it is in direct conflict
with federal statutory law. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Energy
Resources Conservation & Development Commission, 461 U.S.
190, 204 (1982) (noting that this conflict is found where state common law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress"). Plaintiffs in
this case ask for judicial regulation of carbon dioxide emissions
into the atmosphere. But to do so would be in direct conflict with
numerous Acts and pronouncements of Congress.
A number of pieces of legislation have ordered research and
negotiation of global warming issues, while declining or prohibiting any regulation. See The Global Climate Protection Act of 1987,
15 U.S.C. § 2901; National Climate Program Act of 1978, 15
U.S.C. §§ 2901 et seq., Energy Security Act of 1980, Pub.L. No. 96294, tit. VII, § 711; Global Climate Protection Act of 1987, 15
U.S.C. §§ 2901 and 2952; Global Change Research Act of 1990, 15
U.S.C. §§ 2931-2938; Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub.L. No. 102486, § 1604. After President Clinton initially committed the
United States to the Kyoto Protocol - an international treaty that
forced industrial nations to reduce carbon dioxide emissions - the
Senate unanimously issued a resolution urging the President to
withdraw because of the adverse economic impact that carbon dioxide regulation might have on the country. S. Res. 98, 105th
carbon dioxide emissions, Congress addressed the issue in the CAA by declining
regulation.
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Cong. (1997). Subsequently, Congress passed a number of laws
blocking the enforcement of the Protocol. See Pub.L. No. 105-276
(1998); Pub.L. No. 106-74 (1999); Pub.L. No. 106-377 (2000). Congress was finally appeased when President George W. Bush withdrew the United States as a signatory in 2001. To impose
regulations on carbon dioxide emissions from the judicial bench when Congress has expressly established a policy of non-regulation - would create an intolerable conflict of law. As such, Plaintiffs common law remedies must be seen as preempted.
In addition to the affirmative undertakings of Congress in relation to global warming, it is also important to note the conspicuous instances in which Congress has declined to act. As noted by
the Southern District of New York, "Congress has recognized that
carbon dioxide emissions cause global warming and that global
warming will have severe adverse impacts on the United States,
but it has declined to impose any formal limits on such emissions."
Connecticut v. American Electric Power Company, 406 F. Supp.
265, 268-69 (S.D.N.Y 2006). The silence on this issue does not
mean that Congress wants carbon dioxide regulation to be enacted
by the courts, but rather that they don't want it regulated at all,
until further research has been completed.
The CAA and other legislation are comprehensive not only because of what they regulate, but also because of what they decline
to regulate. As Justice Frankfurter once noted, in interpreting a
statute, "one must ... listen attentively to what it does not say."
Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47
COLUM. L. REV. 527, 536-36 (1947). Reading what the various acts
of Congress say, and understanding what they don't say, it is clear
that judicial regulation of carbon dioxide emissions is in direct
conflict with legislative policy, and therefore preempted.
II.

EVEN IF A COMMON LAW CLAIM CAN BE
MADE, THE PLAINTIFFS LACK STANDING
BECAUSE THEY CANNOT ARTICULATE A
SUFFICIENTLY CONCRETE INJURY.

Article III of the U.S. Constitution grants jurisdiction to the
federal courts only for "cases and controversies." U.S. Const. Art.
III. As a practical matter, this means that in order for a plaintiff
to have standing to sue in federal court, they are constitutionally
required to satisfy three elements: (1) They suffered an "injury in
fact," not merely a speculative or hypothetical injury; (2) There is
a causal connection between that injury and the alleged miscon-
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duct, and the injury was not caused by some third party; and (3) It
is likely, not just possible, that the injury will be redressed by a
favorable court decision. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555 (1992).
There is some debate as to the second and third elements of
standing in this case. Because of conflicting scientific research on
the issue of global warming, it is impossible to prove with certainty the existence of global warming, much less its causes and
effects. See generally Blake R. Bertagna, "Standing" Up for the
Environment: The Ability of Plaintiffs to EstablishLegal Standing
to Redress Injuries Caused by Global Warming, 2006 B.Y.U. L.
REV. 415 (2006). And even assuming the problem is real, harmful,
and caused by human activity, causation is difficult to establish
because of the countless contributors to carbon dioxide emissions
worldwide. Bertagna, 2006 B.Y.U L. REV. at 455. Further, since
some scientists have published opinions that global warming has
advanced too far to be reversed, it is uncertain whether government regulation on any level will redress the problem. See Con-

troversial Scientist Predicts Planetary Wipeout,

THE EVENING

Nov. 28 2006, available at http:ll
www.thisislondon.co.uk/news/article-23376247details/Controversial§cientistlredictsilanetary+wipeout/article.do. But the main
deficiency in Plaintiffs' standing is that they have failed to establish that they will suffer an imminent future injury sufficient to
constitute an "injury in fact."
STANDARD

A.

ONLINE,

Plaintiffs' predicted future injury does not create
standing because it is not "substantially probable"
to occur.

Under general federal law, Plaintiffs can create standing by
claiming a future (rather than present) injury, but only if that injury is "substantially probable" to occur in the "imminent" future.
National Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 464 F.3d 1, 12-13
(D.C. Cir. 2006); Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61. The Supreme Court
has defined "imminent" to mean "certainly impending. '4 Lujan,
504 U.S. at 564, n.2.
4. In cases involving "procedural injuries" - where an administrative regulation
or action will allegedly cause a future private harm - the standards of imminence are
relaxed, and courts require only a "reasonable" or "realistic" probability of injury for
standing to be created. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573, n.7. But this is not the case for the
common law claims.
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As scholars have noted, future global warming injuries are
anything but "certain" because the "claims are based entirely on
conjectural, complex systems of climate modeling." Bertagna,
2006 B.Y.U. L. REV. at 444. Although these complex scientific
models are almost certainly useful, Bertagna's recent article
points out that the science is frequently exaggerated or
inaccurate:
How sure can climate scientists be about the predictions produced by their models? In a recent paper by an anthropologist
who studied several years at the National Center for Atmospheric Research, [the anthropologist] admitted that even climate modelers may be uncertain about their findings. She
actually quoted one climate modeler as saying, "It's easy to get
caught up in it; you start to believe that what happens in your
model must be what happens in the real world. And often that is
not true." Some scientists argue that the standard climate models upon which [a] plaintiffs claim would be based assume that
carbon dioxide concentration follows a perfectly linear growth
rate of one percent per year, yet studies show the actual growth
rate over the last fifteen years to be about 0.58 percent. The use
of such an exaggerated figure demonstrates that the models
may ignore reality and "run way too fast, predicting warming
coming almost twice as fast ... or predicting much more warming in a given time."
Bertagna, 2006 B.Y.U. L. REV. at 445 (internal citations and
footnotes omitted) (quoting Hollman W. Jenkins, Jr., A Global
Warming Worksheet, WALL ST. J., Feb. 1, 2006, at A15). Like the
research discussed by Bertagna, the claims by the Plaintiffs in the
instant case are dependent on predictions, which in turn are dependent on controversial climate models. Though such predictions have their usefulness, they are insufficient to create the
"substantial probability" required for standing, because the data
are too speculative for Article III purposes.
The federal appellate court for the District of Columbia Circuit has agreed that projections based on climate modeling fail to
meet the requirement of an imminent injury-in-fact. In National
Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 440 F.3d 476 (D.C. Cir. 2006)
(NRDC I), the court noted the flaws and inaccurate tendencies of
climate models, and held that they were incapable of establishing
"imminence." Although a re-hearing of the case granted standing
for those particular Plaintiffs, the opinion was careful to note that
it was not deciding whether climate modeling data could always
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be used to establish an imminent future injury. National Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 461 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2006)
(NRDC II). Further, because NRDC was a suit against the EPA
for an alleged "procedural injury," and not a tort claim against a
private corporation, the standards for establishing imminence
were relaxed. See supra, at Note 4. It is unlikely that under the
more stringent standard of "substantial probability" of imminent
injury, the D.C. Circuit would have been willing to reconsider
their initial opinion.
III. EVEN IF THE PLAINTIFFS HAVE STANDING
TO SUE, THE CORPORATIONS ARE NOT
PROPER DEFENDANTS BECAUSE THE
DOCTRINE OF "JOINT AND SEVERAL
LIABILITY" IS NOT APPLICABLE.
Under the rule of joint and several liability, "Where the tortuous acts of two or more wrongdoers join to produce an indivisible
injury, that is, an injury which from its nature cannot be apportioned with reasonable certainty to the individual wrongdoers, all
of the wrongdoers will be held jointly and severally liable for the
entire damages and the injured party may proceed to judgment
against any one separately or against all in one suit." Landers v.
East Texas Salt Water Disposal Co., 248 S.W.2d 731, 734 (Tex.
1952) (emphasis added). Plaintiffs attempt to apply this doctrine
to hold each of the Corporations entirely responsible for the whole
amount of damage suffered by the Plaintiffs from global warming.
This is an incredibly brash demand, considering that under the
undisputed facts found by the lower court, each of the Corpora5
tions contributes less than one percent of the world's emissions.
Inuksuk, Civ. Action No. 05-5240 at 6. To hold any civil defendant
liable for at least 100 times the amount of damage that they actually caused (especially when the federal government has expressly
declined to regulate their activity) would be an appalling miscarriage of justice. See Grossman, 28 COLUMB. J. ENVTL. L. at 32
("Holding... potential defendants.., jointly and severally liable
for the entire harm of climate change could understandably be
5. According to those undisputed facts, United States power plants are responsible for 10% of the world's carbon dioxide emissions. The five defendant Corporations
account for roughly half of that 10%. With that 5% divided equally between each Corporation, each entity is left with about a 1% share of worldwide emissions.
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seen as unfair."). 6 As will be discussed below, other courts have
recognized this injustice, and have fashioned alternative
approaches.
A.

Joint and several liability is disfavored in the modern
era of comparative fault, and should not be used.

The doctrine of joint and several liability gained almost universal use in state courts after the Landers decision, but has lost
relevance since the "comparative fault" revolution in the 1980's

and 1990's. Jacob A. Stein, 3

STEIN ON PERSONAL INJURY DAMAGES

§ 19:18 (3rd Edition 2006) (noting that "all but four
states have adopted some form of comparative responsibility").
According to Stein, "The shift to comparative responsibility usually results in reconsideration and adjustment of a number of interrelated doctrines. One of these is the common law of joint and
several liability ...Thirty-seven jurisdictions have adopted some
alterations to [that] common-law rule." Id.
Although most of these alterations and abolitions have come
through the statutory process, sometimes the doctrine has been
eliminated judicially. Shortly after the Tennessee legislature
adopted a scheme of comparative fault, that state's Supreme
Court ruled that the new regime "render[ed] the doctrine of joint
and several liability obsolete." McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d
52, 58 (Tenn. 1992). The Court continued: "Having thus adopted a
rule more closely linking liability and fault, it would be inconsistent to retain a rule, joint and several liability, which may fortuitously impose a liability that is out of all proportion to fault." Id.
In order to avoid such disproportionate "justice," this Court should
recognize, in keeping with the majority of state jurisdictions, that
the doctrine of joint and several liability has no further general
applicability.
TREATISE

6. See also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433(B)(2) cmt. e: "If a hundred factories each contribute a small, but still uncertain, amount of pollution to a stream, to
hold each of them liable for the entire damage because he cannot show the amount of
his contribution may perhaps be unjust."
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Even if the doctrine of joint and several liability
lives, it should be disregarded here in favor of the
"market share" theory of liability.

Fortunately, creative, superior replacements have been fashioned to the old doctrine of joint and several liability. In his 2003
article on the subject, Daniel Grossman suggested an alternative:
To avoid ... inequity, courts may require apportionment even
where harms seem indivisible, if some means of fair and rational apportionment is possible without causing injustice to
any of the parties. In pollution cases, for instance, a seemingly
indivisible harm can be treated as divisible and apportioned
among defendants on the basis of evidence of their respective
quantities of pollution discharged. In the climate change context, this division could involve apportioning damages (appropriately reduced to account for past emissions) based on a
combination of defendants' market shares and the greenhouse
gas emissions of their products, to correspond as much as possible to each defendant's contributions to global warming.
Grossman, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. at 32-33.
Initially developed by the California Supreme Court to apportion liability in the DES class action cases, see Sindell v. Abbott
Labratories, 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1990), the "market share" theory
of liability was later used in "Agent Orange" litigation and was
applied to the pollution context this year in Re: Methyl Tertiary
Butyl Ether Products Liability Litigation, 447 F. Supp. 2d 289
(S.D.N.Y 2006) ("MTBE"). Although some federal courts had already generally recognized the separability of liability in the air
pollution public nuisance realm, see for example Michie v. Great
Lakes Steel Division, 495 F. 2d 213, 216-17 (6th Cir. 1974), this
was apparently the first time a federal court had utilized the market share theory as a specific strategy for doing so.
In MTBE, a New York county sued several corporations that
manufactured MTBE, a pollutant found in certain gasolines. Because the doctrine of joint and several liability was no longer
available, the court outlined the alternative: "New York has unequivocally adopted the market share theory of liability when the
[pollutant] in question is fungible, and as a result, the plaintiff
cannot identify which defendant caused her harm." MTBE, 447 F.
Supp. 2d at 299. Under that rule, "each defendant is severally liable for the portion of the judgment that represented its share of
the market at the time of the injury, unless it proves that it could
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not have made the product that caused the plaintiffs harm."7 Id.
at 299-300. The court applied this theory to the corporate defendants: "Plaintiffs have named almost fifty defendants who participated in the national gasoline market during a twenty-five year
period . . .It is likely that each defendant's contribution to the
total volume of MTBE-containing gasoline . . .was very small.
Under these circumstances, it would be fundamentally unfair to
hold these defendants jointly and severally liable."8 Id. at 303.
Here too there are multiple corporate defendants who contributed a measurably small amount to a pollution injury. Each Corporation's market share has already been calculated and noted by
the District Court - somewhere near one percent. With such undisputed quantification, Plaintiffs' injury is not "indivisible."
Rather, it is easily divisible, and readily able to be "apportioned
with reasonable certainty to the individual wrongdoers," should
liability be established.
IV.

EVEN IF THE PLAINTIFFS' COMMON LAW
CLAIMS WERE EXAMINED ON THE MERITS,
THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE
SHOULD PLAY NO ROLE IN THE
TRADITIONAL BALANCING TEST.

There is no universally accepted definition of the precautionary principle. One analysis identified 14 different formulations of
the principle in treaties and nontreaty declarations. Kenneth R.
Foster, et. al, Science and the PrecautionaryPrinciple (May 12,
2000), at http://www.biotech-info.net/scienceandPP.html. One
of the most frequently cited articulations is found in the Wing7. This approach is recognized by the Restatement (Third) of Torts, which states
regarding product liability cases:
In deciding whether to adopt a rule of [market share] liability, courts
have considered the following factors: 1) the generic nature of the defective product; 2) the long latency period of the harm; 3) the inability of
Plaintiffs to discover which defendant's product caused plaintiffs harm,
even after exhaustive discovery; 4) the clarity of the causal connection
between the defective product and the harm suffered by Plaintiffs; 5) the
absence of other medical or environmental factors that could have caused
or materially contributed to the harm; and 6) the availability of sufficient
'market share' data to support a reasonable apportionment of liability.
8. The MTBE court also acknowledged the plaintiffs argument that federal
CERCLA law regularly imposes joint and several liability when there are multiple
polluting defendants. But the court distinguished those cases, noting that the language in the CERCLA act itself authorizes such liability. MTBE, 447 F. Supp. 2d at
303, n. 61.
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spread Statement, produced in 1998 by a gathering of scientists,
philosophers, lawyers and environmental activists in the United
States, which pronounced that: "When an activity raises threats of
harm to the environment or human health, precautionary measures should be taken even if some cause and effect relationships
are not fully established scientifically." Science and Environmental Health Network, Wingspread Conference on the Precautionary
Principle, at http://www.sehn.org/wing.html.
The Plaintiffs argue that this principle of international environmental law should be considered in the balancing test for public nuisance cases when C0 2 damage occurs to property outside of
the United States. Even if the Plaintiffs succeed in proving that a
law of nuisance exists under which they can bring their claims
and that they have legal standing, the precautionary principle is
of no avail to them. The principle has not been adopted, formally
or informally, by the U.S. federal government, and there is no case
law supporting its application. Furthermore, the principle is irrelevant in public nuisance actions, because nuisance actions seek to
correct an injury that has already occurred. The precautionary
principle is a policy that instructs the scientific and technical community to generate knowledge about adverse health or environmental consequences before actions are taken or new technologies
adopted. Thus, the principle should play no role in the in balancing of benefits versus harm in a nuisance analysis.
A.

The precautionary principle not an accepted tenant
of U.S. law, domestic policy, or international
relations.

The precautionary principle is a controversial risk management policy that has not been indoctrinated into U.S. law or domestic policy. H. Rajan Sharma, Precaution as Principle: Law,
Science & Catastrophe in Bhopal(2004), at http://www.iitk.ac.in/
che/jpg/papersb/full%20papers/S%20%201-31.doc;
see also

Zygmunt J.B. Plater et al., ENVIRONMENTAL LAw AND POLICY: NATURE, LAw, AND SOCIETY 1268 (4th ed. 2004). No federal statute

or federal administrative regulation refers to the precautionary

principle. Stephen G. Wood, et. al., WHITHER THE PRECAUTIONARY
PRINCIPLE? AN AMERICAN ASSESSMENT FROM AN ADMINISTRATIVE

54 Am. J. Comp. L. 581, 583 (Fall 2006). Furthermore, few U.S. court decisions have even referenced the principle by name, and none have relied on it in any meaningful way
in reaching their decision. Id.
LAW PERSPECTIVE,
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Additionally, while the principle appears in more than a
dozen international instruments, nearly all adopt different articulations of the principle, and none are binding on the United
States. Stephen G. Wood, 54 Am. J. Comp. L. at 589-598. Moreover, the varying formulations are "not compatible with one another, incoherent, cost-blind, and are hopelessly vague providing
no guidance." Stephen G. Wood, 54 Am. J. Comp. L. at 609.
B.

The precautionary principle is inapplicable in
nuisance actions, because the principle applies to
future, not past conduct.

A public nuisance has been defined as the "doing of or the failure to do something that injuriously affects the safety, health, or
morals of the public, or works some substantial annoyance, inconvenience or injury to the public generally." U.S. v. COUNTY BD. OF
ARLINGTON COUNTY, 487 F.Supp. 137, 143 (D.C. Va., 1979). When
injury is shown, courts traditionally undertake a balancing of the
harm or inconvenience to those injured by the nuisance with the
overall harm which would occur if the injunction is granted is undertaken by the courts. See United States v. Reserve Mining Company, 380 F.Supp. 11 (D.C.Minn.1974). The precautionary
principle is inapplicable in that analysis, because the principle
deals with actions or policies that might cause harm to the public,
not those shown to have harmed. The principle urges precaution
to prevent harm, instructing advocates to generate knowledge
about adverse health or environmental consequences before actions are taken or new technologies adopted. H. Rajan Sharma,
Precaution as Principle: Law, Science & Catastrophe in
Bhopal(2004).9
Although the wording of the principle may differ, the aforementioned interpretation has been adopted in the U.S. The City
of San Francisco passed a Precautionary Principle Policy which
among other things, requires the city to weigh the environmental
and health costs of its annual purchases and to take a preventative rather reactive approach to governance. City and County of

San Francisco Environmental Code,

PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE

(2005), available at http://www.municode.coml
Resources/gateway.asp?pid= 14134&sid=5.
In sum, the principle's intent is to influence environmentally
responsible behavior before actions are taken or new technologies
POLICY STATEMENT

9. Full citation purposely omitted for formatting, see page 20.

21

524

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24

adopted, which makes it irrelevant in a public nuisance balancing
test. In addition, neither the federal government nor the federal
judiciary has endorsed its use in this context.
V.

THE EPA HAS NEITHER THE OBLIGATION NOR
THE AUTHORITY UNDER CAA § 115 TO ISSUE AN
ENDANGERMENT FINDING TO THE GOVERNOR OF
NEW UNION WITH RESPECT TO THE
CORPORATIONS CARBON DIOXIDE EMISSIONS.

The central purpose of the CAA is to "protect and enhance the
quality of the Nation's air resources so as to promote the public
health and welfare and the productive capacity of its population."
42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1). Sections 108 and 109 of the Act authorize
the EPA to create a list of air pollutants that "in the Administrator's judgment, cause or contribute to air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare" and
to establish National Ambient Air Quality Standards ("NAAQS")
for those pollutants. States have "primary responsibility" for
preventing and controlling air pollution at its source, which is accomplished through EPA-approved state implementation plans
("SIPs") that implement, maintain, and enforce the NAAQS. 42
U.S.C. §§ 7401(a)(3), 7409(a), (b), 7410(a).
The provision at issue here is CAA § 115, which allows the
Administrator of the EPA to issue an endangerment finding to a
State emitting pollution affecting the public health or welfare of a
foreign country. 42 U.S.C. § 7415. Under § 115, the Administrator shall issue such a finding whenever he has "reason to believe"
a U.S. polluter is harming a foreign country with which the U.S.
has a similar pollution control agreement. Id. However, the EPA
has neither the obligation nor the authority under CAA § 115 to
issue an endangerment finding with respect to CO 2 emissions
from the Corporations that requires a reduction in emissions to a
level achievable using the currently available control technology
for two primary reasons: (1) CAA § 115 does not give the EPA regulatory authority over CO 2 emissions; (2) even if the EPA is found
to have regulatory powers over CO 2 emissions under CAA § 115,
the statute gives the EPA broad discretionary authority to make
regulatory determinations.
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CAA § 115 does not give the EPA regulatory authority
over carbon dioxide emissions.

The EPA has express authority under the CAA to regulate
numerous substances specifically identified in the statute.10 However, nowhere in Congress's extensive regulatory scheme is C02
mentioned, except in the context of provisions that authorize its
study, monitoring, and the evaluation of nonregulatory strategies. 1 1 A search for CAA regulations on global warming is equally
illustrative of Congressional intent. The one and only provision in
the CAA that references global warming also contains an express
disclaimer that it "shall not be construed to be the basis of any
additional regulation under [the CAA]." 42 U.S.C. § 7671a(e).
Thus, Congress has had ample opportunity to regulate CO 2 emissions and has affirmatively chosen to limit the EPA's endeavors
on CO 2 to nonregulatory activities under the CAA.
In determining the meaning of a statute, the inquiry involves
not only the statute itself but also the larger statutory context. IN
RE BDT FARMS, INC., 21 F.3d 1019, 1021 (10th Cir. 1994). The intent of Congress may be ascertained through the statutory language and the legislative history. See Train v. Colorado Pub. Int.
Research Group, Inc., 426 U.S. 1, 10 (1976). The 1990 Amendments to the CAA, which introduced the nonregulatory provisions
citing CO 2, were the subject of much Congressional debate. Senate bill 1630, the Clean Air Restoration and Standards Attainment Act of 1989, was introduced in the Environment and Public
Works Committee containing language that would have arguably
given the EPA wide-ranging authority to regulate CO 2 and other
greenhouse gases. S. Rep. No. 228, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989)
at 1. Title VII of the bill dealt with ozone and climate protection
and found that emissions such as CO 2 imperiled health and the
environment worldwide and should be controlled. S. 1630 § 501,
101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 Cong. Rec. 20521 (1989). Conversely,
10. For example, CAA § 112(b) lists 190 hazardous air pollutants ("HAPs") that
Congress has determined require regulation. 42 U.S.C. § 7412. Similarly, Title VI of
the CAA authorizes EPA to list and regulate any substance that "is known or may
reasonably be anticipated to cause or contribute to harmful effects on the stratospheric ozone layer." 42 U.S.C. § 7671a. Fifty-two substances are listed in that provision. Id.
11. For instance, CAA § 103(g), which authorizes the Administrator to establish a
research and development program for prevention and control of air pollution, lists
CO2 as one of several items to be considered in EPA's performance of a "basic engineering research and technology program to develop, evaluate and demonstrate
nonregulatory strategies and technologies." 42 U.S.C. § 7403.
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the House version contained no language addressing stratospheric
ozone depletion or global warming. H. Rep. No. 101-490, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess., Parts 1-2 (1990). The Congressional legislation
that ultimately emerged as the 1990 Amendments to the CAA contained none of the Senate's provisions regarding global warming
and CO 2 . As the Supreme Court has noted, "[flew principles of
statutory construction are more compelling than the proposition
that Congress does not intend sub silentio to enact statutory language that it has earlier discarded in favor of other language."
INS v. Cardozo-Fonseca,480 U.S. 421, 442-43 (1987).
Despite Congress's consistency in rejecting measures to restrict greenhouse gas emissions such as CO 2, the Plaintiffs contend that the EPA has a duty to regulate CO 2 under CAA § 115.
Section 115 addresses the issue of international air pollution and
provides in relevant part that:
"Whenever the Administrator, upon receipt of reports, surveys
or studies from any duly constituted international agency has
reason to believe that any air pollutant or pollutants emitted in
the United States cause or contribute to air pollution which may
reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare
in a foreign country or whenever the Secretary of State requests
him to do so with respect to such pollution which the Secretary
of State alleges is of such nature, the Administrator shall give
formal notification thereof to the Governor of the state in which
such emissions originate." 42 U.S.C. § 7415(a).
Under § 115(b), the notice of the Administrator to the State
Governor is "deemed to be a finding" under § 115(a) that the SIP
"is inadequate to prevent or eliminate the endangerment referred
to in subsection (a) of this section" and must be revised. 42 U.S.C.
§ 7415(b). This process is known as the "SIP revision" procedure.
Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario v. EPA, 912 F.2d 1525,
1528 (D.C. Cir. 1990). This regulatory mechanism was not designed or intended to regulate greenhouse gases like CO 2. Because of the unique nature of greenhouse gases like CO 2,
regulating such emissions under § 115's SIP revision and if allowed, would broaden the statutory provision well beyond its intended scope.
Carbon dioxide is a clear, odorless gas that is emitted into the
earth's atmosphere naturally through the carbon cycle and
through human activities like the burning of oil, coal and gas, and
deforestation. See National Research Council's report, Climate
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Change Science: An Analysis of Some of the Key Questions (National Academy Press, 2001). Once CO 2 is released it can remain
in the atmosphere for roughly 50-200 years. Id. The pervasive
nature of CO 2 along with the natural processes of atmospheric circulation and air movement results in a vast globalatmospheric
pool of CO 2. Id. Thus, unlike pollutants on the EPA's NAAQS list
such as carbon monoxide and particulate matter, which vary from
place to place as a result of differences in local or regional emissions and other factors (e.g., topography), CO 2 is fairly consistent
in concentration throughout the world's atmosphere. Id.
In Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50 (D.C. Cir. 2005), a
group of organizations petitioned the EPA to regulate emissions of
CO 2 and other greenhouse gases from motor vehicles under CAA
§ 202. In its notice denying the petition for rulemaking, the EPA
stated the "nature of the global pool would mean that any CO 2
standard that might be established would in effect be a worldwide
ambient air quality standard, not a national standard-the entire
world would be either in compliance or out of compliance." 69 Fed.
Reg. 52,922, 52,927 (Sept. 8, 2003). The EPA went on to note that
such a situation "would be inconsistent with a basic underlying
premise of the CAA regime. . .- that actions taken by individual
states and by the EPA can generally" lead to the attainment of a
NAAQS. Id. at 52,927. In light of the homogenous concentrations
of CO 2 throughout the atmosphere and the substantial emissions
of CO 2 from foreign sources, including Canada, if the EPA was
forced to revise New Union's SIP to include air quality measures
for CO 2 emissions, the EPA would be imposing a standard on New
Union that would be impossible for them to meet. Such a regulatory scheme could not have been intended by Congress.
B.

Even if the EPA is found to have regulatory powers
over CO 2 emissions under CAA § 115, the statute
gives the EPA broad discretionary authority to
make regulatory determinations.

Under CAA § 155, the Administrator's formal finding that
pollution emanating from the United States may endanger public
health or welfare in a foreign country is referred to as an "endangerment finding." Her Majesty the Queen, 912 F.2d at 1528. Once
that determination is made, certain statutorily mandated consequences, including the issuance of notice to the State in which the
emissions originate and SIP revision, follow; but the decision
whether to make that determination as an initial matter is a dis-
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cretionary one. 42 U.S.C. § 7415(b); Her Majesty the Queen, 912
F.2d at 1528.
As the district court noted, Her Majesty the Queen in Right of
Ontario v. EPA speaks directly to the EPA's discretion in deciding
whether to make a threshold regulatory determination under
CAA § 115. In Her Majesty the Queen, the Province of Ontario and
a number of States and environmental groups petitioned the EPA
for an endangerment finding with respect to U.S. emissions that
allegedly result in harmful levels of acid deposition in Canada.
912 F.2d at 1527-1528. The EPA argued that because it lacked
sufficient information to trace the pollutants from the point of
deposition back to their sources, the agency was not obligated to
make an endangerment finding. In denying the Plaintiffs' petition, the court stated, "[tihe words 'whenever' the Administrator
'has reason to believe' imply a degree of discretion underlying the
endangerment finding." Id. at 1533.
Courts have consistently interpreted similar statutory provisions in the CAA and other environmental statutes as leaving the
decision whether to investigate or initiate enforcement proceedings to agency discretion. For example, in Sierra Club v. Whitman, 268 F.3d 898, 900-903 (9th Cir. 2001), the court rejected the
Sierra Club's argument that § 1319(a)(3) of the Clean Water Actwhich provides that "[wihenever on the basis of any information
available to him the Administrator finds" a violation of certain §s
of the CWA, the Administrator "shall issue an order requiring
such person to comply" with the statute or "shall bring a civil action"-imposed an obligation on the EPA to make findings when
provided with information suggesting a violation. Similarly, in
New York Public Interest Research Group v. Whitman, 321 F.3d
316, 330 (2d Cir. 2003), the court stated that the "key phrase of
[CAA] § 502(i)(1) is the opening one, '[wihenever the Administrator makes a determination,' and this language grants discretion"
to the EPA regarding deficiencies in state operating permit programs under.
The EPA's refusal to initiate action against the Corporations
should be reversed only upon a finding that the Administrator's
failure to act was "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law." American Horse Protection
Ass'n v. Lyng, 812 F.2d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 1987). As the court inAmerican Horse ProtectionAss'n v. Lyng, noted an examination of a decision under the "arbitrary and capricious" standard encompasses
"a range of levels of deference to the agency," with an agency's
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refusal to initiate rulemaking proceedings at "the high end of the
range." Id. at 5. "Only in the rarest and most compelling of circumstances" should such a refusal be overturned. WWHT, Inc. v.
FCC, 656 F.2d 807, 818 (D.C.Cir.1981). The main inquiry is
weather the agency's decision-making was "reasoned." American
Horse ProtectionAss'n v. Lyng, 812 F.2d at 5.
As in Her Majesty the Queen, the EPA denied the petition to
regulate the Corporations' CO 2 emissions in this instance on the
grounds that it lacks sufficient information to establish causation.
R. at 8. Since there are an untold number of other sources of C0 2,
the EPA is unable to definitively link the Corporations' CO 2 emissions and those of the U.S. as a whole to the injury complained of.
Id. That conclusion reflects a reasonable exercise of the Agency's
discretion, and is in keeping with the court's
Although the EPA asserted that CO 2 emissions were more
likely than not related to the short ice season, our earlier discussion of the unique nature of greenhouse gas emissions demonstrates the futility of EPA action against the Corporations
because, as noted by the district court, there is no indication that
it would remedy the problems in Inuksuk. R. at 11. In Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50 (D.C. Cir. 2005), the D.C. Circuit Court
upheld the Administrator's decision not to regulate greenhouse
gas emissions from motor vehicles, because, among other things,
promulgating such regulations would "result in an inefficient,
piecemeal approach to the climate change issue." Id. at 58.
Like motor vehicles, the Corporations represent only one of
many sources of greenhouse gas emissions in the United States.
Mandating an endangerment finding under CAA § 155 would arbitrarily and unfairly single out the Corporations and ask the
EPA to make scientific findings with respect to CO 2 emission
levels that it is unauthorized and unprepared to make. Moreover,
courts have recognized that the EPA may properly defer making
an endangerment determination while it waits for additional scientific and technical studies to be completed. Her Majesty the
Queen, 912 F.2d at 1533-1534. Any rulemaking with respect to
CO 2 emissions is premature until, as the court in Massachusetts,
noted more information is known concerning climate change and
the potential options for addressing global warming. Id. at 57.
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THE PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM IMPLICATES POLICY
DECISIONS THAT MAKE THIS ISSUE
NONJUSTICIABLE UNDER THE BAKER
TESTS.

Courts have long acknowledged that certain "political questions" are meant to be addressed by the legislative and executive
branches of government. See, e.g., Occidental of Umm al
Qaywayn, Inc. v. A Certain Cargo of Petroleum, 577 F.2d 1196,
1203 (5th Cir. 1978). The genesis of the political question doctrine
is the "constitutional separation and dispersement of powers
among the branches of government," and the "limitation of the judiciary as a decisional body." Id.; see also, Coleman v.Miller, 307
U.S. 433 (1939). As the Supreme Court has held, "[t]he judiciary
is particularly ill suited to make such decisions, as courts are fundamentally underequipped to formulate national policies or develop standards for matters not legal in nature." JAPAN WHALING
ASS'N V. AMERICAN CETACEAN Soc., 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986).
In the seminal case of Baker v. Carr,369 U.S. 186 (1962), the
Supreme Court set forth six alternative tests for finding an issue
nonjusticiable as a political question:
(1) "a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the
issue to a coordinate political department; or
(2) a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards
for resolving it; or
(3) the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or
(4) the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing the lack of respect due coordinate
branches of government; or
(5) an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political
decision already made; or
(6) the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.".
Id. at 217. If any one of the six Baker tests is met, the court
must dismiss the case. Schneider v. Kissinger, 412 F.3d 190, 194
(D.C. Cir. 2005).
The court need not decide whether the Trail Smelter doctrine
applies to this controversy, because application of the Baker tests
demonstrates that the claim is nonjusticiable. The Plaintiffs' requests have touched on numerous areas of national and international policy regulated by the executive and legislative branches of
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government, which present issues substantially similar to those
reviewed in Connecticut v. American Electric Power Company.
406 F.Supp.2d 265 (S.D. NY 2005). In Connecticut, the Plaintiffs
asked the court to cap CO 2 emissions of five large power companies and to mandate annual reductions in CO 2 emissions. Id. at
272. As in Connecticut, resolution of this claim by the judiciary
would require this court to, at the very least:
"determine the appropriate level at which to cap the carbon dioxide emissions of these Defendants; (2) determine the appropriate percentage reduction to impose upon Defendants; (3) create
a schedule to implement those reductions; (4) determine and
balance the implications of such relief on the United States'
ongoing negotiations with other nations concerning global climate change; (5) assess and measure available alternative energy resources; and (6) determine and balance the implications
of such relief on the United States' energy sufficiency and thus
its national security-all without an 'initial policy determination' having been made by the elected branches."
Id. at 272.
As will be shown, the overarching issue presents a clearly
nonjusticiable political question, because a determination is not
judicially manageable. In addition, the issue cannot be resolved
without formulating and balancing complex national energy, commercial, and environmental policies that are the subject of both
congressional and executive decision-making. Moreover, a judicial
resolution would involve a piecemeal adjudication of claims that
would subvert those national policies.
A.

The Court lacks judicially discoverable and
manageable standards.

If there are no legal tools allowing a court to reach a ruling
that is "principled, rational, and based upon reasoned distinctions," the claim is not justiciable. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S.
267, 278 (2004). Consideration of the critical policy issues implicated and the considerable involvement in addressing those issues, it would be impossible for the court to formulate a
principled, rational, and manageable basis for adjudication at this
time.
Primarily, this is no judicially manageable standards for determining whether and to what extent the alleged effects of the
Corporations support the Plaintiffs' assertion that they should be
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held liable for the emissions that has led to the global warming
which is causing damage to Canadian coastal villages. Moreover,
the Court would have to determine how to implement the relief.
There is simply no judicially discoverable or manageable standard
for making such a far-reaching policy judgment that implicates
numerous political determinations by the federal government, especially since, as the district court noted, "there are almost no
other cases in which a state was held internationally responsible
for causing transboundary harm" and no cases involving the CAA.
In light of the aforementioned discussion of the difficulty controlling and measuring greenhouse gas emissions like C0 2 , the untold
number of sources, and the court's lack of both the necessary resources and expertise available to the political branches, such a
determination would be unmanageable and should be left to those
with a "special expertise" at the "frontiers of [environmental] science." Her Majesty the Queen, 912. F.2d 1525, 1534. R. at 12.
B.

The claim requires initial policy determinations to be
made by the elected branches.

The issues raised by Plaintiffs' claim also require "initial policy determination[s] of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion."
Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. Judicial resolution of this claim would
require the court to devise national policies for, among other
things, the transboundary air pollution and would disrupt the government's ability to set a single coordinated plan to address global
warming. Such determinations clearly rest with the political
branches of government, not the judiciary.
In Connecticut, the court dismissed the Plaintiffs' public nuisance claims against U.S. power companies based on emissions allegedly responsible for global warming as presenting a
nonjusticiable political question. 406 F. Supp. 2d at 265. Finding
that "Ib]ecause resolution of the issues presented here requires
identification and balancing of economic, environmental, foreign
policy, and national security interests, an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion is required." Id. at
274 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The court
reasoned that the political branches have already taken extensive
steps to address global warming issues and that "Congress has
vested administrative authority" over the "technically complex
area of environmental law." Id. at 268-273.
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Judicial resolution of this issue is impossible and
would express a profound a lack of respect for
Congressional policy decisions on a matter that
calls for unquestioning adherence by the
courts.

As set forth above, the political branches have aggressively
debated the issue of global warming and the regulation of CO 2 and
other greenhouse gases. Instead of implementing specific regulations, Congress has chosen to authorize the Administrator to establish programs for prevention and control of global air pollution,
including CO 2 emissions. 42 U.S.C. § 7403.
In seeking a judicial determination on the regulation of C0 2,
the Plaintiffs ask this court to exhibit a profound lack of respect
for the prior determinations of the political branches. Granting
the relief they request would disrupt decades of Congressional and
executive branch policy choices and would intrude into the ongoing and enormously complex political debate concerning the appropriate means to address global warming. Environmental
policy, in particular, presents an "unusual need for unquestioning
adherence," Baker, 369 U.S. at 217, to the decisions of the political
branches because, as here, "contradiction would seriously interfere with important governmental interests." Kadic v. Karadzic,
70 F.3d 232, 249 (2d Cir. 1995).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Genergy Corp., Atomic Energy,
Inc., Centennial Power Co., Power Suppliers Co., and First Energy, Ltd., respectfully request that this Court affirm the district
court's grant of summary judgment.
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